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Constitutional Legacies of Empire in Politics and Administration: Jamaica’s Incomplete Settlement1 
I Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that formal constitutional rules matter to the manner in which so-
cieties are governed. They are critical for deciding winners and losers in society, and embody 
‘the principle that the exercise of political power shall be bounded by rules, rules which de-
termine the validity of legislative and executive action by prescribing the procedure accord-
ing to which it must be performed or by delimiting its permissible content.’2 It is also widely 
recognised that informal institutions—defined here as as implicit understandings between 
constitutional actors3—matter for offering interpretive guidance as to the meaning and ap-
plication of constitutional rules.  Finally, it is similarly acknowledged that the colonial origins 
of constitutions matter.  The ‘transfer’ of constitutional arrangements from ‘metropolis’ to 
colonies has however rarely been straightforward, and the colonial inheritance has had a sig-
nificant effect on subsequent post-colonial political, economic and social development in 
newly independent nations.  
So far, so bland. What is less well understood is the manner in which transplanted constitu-
tional ideas are affected by informal institutions - and how these matter for constitutional 
development. As yet, there has been limited interest in such ‘transplant effects’: for example, 
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richards, use this term to describe the detrimental impact on the law’s 
 
1 The authors wish to thank TT Arvind, Charlotte Skeet and Ruth Stirton for critical comments on this article. 
We are grateful for financial support provided by a British Academy International Partnership and Mobility 
Award (PM120200).  
2 S A de Smith, ‘Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth Today’ (1962) 4 Malaya Law Review, 4(2), 205, 205. 
3 This definition, emphasising informal understandings that moderate tensions between constitutional princi-
ples, differs from other ways in which informal institutions have been explored in the context of constitution-
alism, such as the presence of informal power structures affecting the ways in which formal constitutional 
rules operate (such as decision-making in a system of clientelism) or the role of informal conventions in the 
absence of codified constitutional rules. 
 
 
functioning, either where transplanted law is not adapted to local needs, or where it is unfa-
miliar to those who use the law as a result of colonial imposition or otherwise.4 And in a 
study of the harmonisation of arbitral law, T T Arvind links the existence of the ‘transplant ef-
fect’ to ‘the relationship between formal written sources of the law, and unwritten conven-
tions, norms and practices inherent in the legal system.’5 Harmonisation frequently goes 
awry, he argues, because they tend to focus only on the formal institutions of the law, and 
are therefore ‘vulnerable to situations where informal institutions on which the formal insti-
tutions rely are missing in the receiving jurisdiction.’6 
This article focuses on the informal understandings that enable different parties to  mediate 
between ambiguous and conflicting constitutional values that are expressed in formal insti-
tutions. Taking the Westminster model of constitutionalism, and its transplant to Jamaica as 
a case study, this paper focuses on one particular tension, namely that which exists between 
‘responsibility’ and ‘representation’. Within the formal institutions of the Westminster system, 
we argue, these values are expressed in the relationship between a politically accountable 
‘political directorate’ and a permanent, neutral and impartial civil service. The viability of this 
institutional relationship, and its capacity to negotiate the tension that exists between re-
sponsibility and representation, however, depended, we argue, on the existence of what 
Leslie Lipson (in the context of New Zealand) called a ‘mutually beneficial bargain’.7   
 
4 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 163. 
5 TT Arvind ‘The “Transplant Effect” in Harmonisation’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
65, 78 
6 Arvind (n 5), 79. 
7 Leslie Lipson, The Politics of Equality (University of Chicago Press 1948), p. 479.  
 
The informal understandings that underpinned relations between politicians and civil serv-
ants in Jamaica were far from constituting a mutually beneficial bargain. In fact, since colo-
nial times, a ‘mutually suspicious bargain’ has persisted. The key features of this distrustful 
bargain had can be found in colonial administration well before independence, and proved 
decisive in shaping Jamaica’s post-colonial political development. This absence an informal 
mutually beneficial understanding regarding the tension between two fundamental constitu-
tional principles of the Westminster system represents the true British colonial legacy. 
By arguing that the true colonial legacy of the Westminster inheritance is a presence of mu-
tual suspicion regarding other parties’ understanding of constitutional principles, this paper 
also resolves a continuing paradox in the literature on Jamaica itself. Decolonisation in Ja-
maica was a process of (broadly) consensual political transition in a two party system; yet, we 
find the disintegration of this consensus in the 1970s, exposing the frailty of informal under-
standings shared between political and administrative elites, which proved unable to medi-
ate between demands for representativeness and demand for responsibility. This argument 
also resolves the apparent contradiction between a literature that points to the transition of 
constitutional principles (and its functioning) in the immediate post-colonial period and a 
subsequent literature that has sought to highlight the dysfunctional characteristics of the 
Westminster transplant in view of a national style of politics that is sometimes characterised 
in terms of patron-client relations.8   
The following section outlines in greater detail the tensions over doctrines of responsible 
and representative government, and how this translated into formal institutions as well as 
informal understandings between politicians and civil servants. Sections III-VI covers, in 
chronological order, the dynamics in the conflict over constitutional understandings in the 
 
8 Carl Stone, Democracy and Clientalism in Jamaica (Transaction Books, 1983).   
 
case of Jamaica. It documents the development of formal and informal executive govern-
ment institutions in the pre-independence period, and how key elements in the ‘mutually 
suspicious bargain’ were left un-addressed in the immediate post-independence decade. The 
failure to address them in this period proved crucial when, in the 1970s, the political consen-
sus that had characterised the 1960s broke down, and a more ideological style of politics 
took hold. The conclusions draw out wider lessons for the understanding of Westminster’s 
‘export models’ in terms of both formal institutions and the informal understandings which 
they presuppose. 
 
II Constitutionalism, responsible and representative government 
The Westminster system’s unresolved tension over the constitutional doctrines of responsible and 
representative government has shaped both metropolitan as well as colonial discussions about 
constitutionalism. In the legal literature, at the core of responsible government is the duty of minis-
ters to account to a democratically elected body. Roberts-Wray, for example, defines responsible 
government as ‘a system of government by or on the advice of ministers who are responsible to a 
legislature consisting wholly, or mainly, of elected members; and this responsibility implies an obli-
gation to resign if they no longer have the confidence of the legislature’.9 Underlying this particular 
conception of responsibility lies a view that ministers should have, as Birch puts it, ‘sufficient inde-
pendence to pursue consistent policies without permitting them to forget their obligation to keep 
in step with public opinion’.10 Yet, as Birch further argues, this is only one among several meanings 
 
9 Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (Stevens 1966), p. 64. 
10 Anthony Birch, Representative and Responsible Government (Allen & Unwin, 1964)  p. 170. 
 
 
of responsibility within British constitutional thought, coming second in terms of priority to the pri-
mary understanding of responsibility as consistency, prudence and leadership.11 A third conception 
of responsibility as responsiveness to public opinion and demands has, he argues, still lower prior-
ity.12  
In contrast to doctrines of responsible government, the idea of representative government seems 
to have no defined meaning in British colonial law, except as an ‘inapt and confusing’13 synonym 
for a representative legislature. In a broader sense, however, the idea of representative government 
is part of the British tradition of constitutionalism, one which, according to Birch, incorporates ele-
ments of distinct political traditions, including a doctrinal commitment to the independent repre-
sentative role of Members of Parliament (understood primarily in terms of their ability to resist the 
influence of sectional interests), the link between MPs and local constituencies, and, perhaps most 
importantly, a concentration of political power within an elected chamber which fairly represented 
all the interests of the country.14  
Within so-called Westminster constitutional systems, the convention of civil service ‘neutrality’ or 
‘impartiality’ is traditionally seen as playing a crucial role in mediating between values of responsi-
bility and representativeness. ‘The task of the politician’, as Jennings understood it, included, ‘main-
tain[ing] a close relationship between public opinion and the process of administration’.15 ‘The ac-
tual business of government’, on the other hand, ‘is the function of professional administrators and 
technical experts’.16 Thus ministers provide the link to the electorate both directly and through Par-
liament, while a permanent civil service enhances responsibility, especially in the primary sense of 
 
11 Birch (n 10), 245. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Roberts-Wray (n 9), p. 69. 
14 Birch (n 10), pp. 230 ff. 
15 Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government (Cambridge University Press, 1958), 125.  
16 Ibid.  
 
 
consistency, prudence and leadership.  While the civil service never occupied a ‘tutelary’ position, in 
the sense used by Hood and Lodge,17 the indivisibility of political and bureaucratic roles in the 
Westminster system of government could be seen as  a kind of ‘Hegelian synthesis’ of responsibil-
ity and representation. For the philosopher Georg Hegel, the middle class of civil servants embod-
ied not so much the popular will as the ‘educated intelligence and legal consciousness of the mass 
of the people’.18 Hegel pointed to the danger that left unchecked, the civil service threatened to 
assume the ‘isolated position of an aristocracy’, and to use ‘its education and skills as an arbitrary 
means of domination’.19 Hegel pointed to the crucial role of institutional structures in mitigating 
against such dangers: the role that the monarchy and organised civil society played in Hegel’s 
Prussia could in Westminster systems arguably said to be discharged by oversight from Ministers 
and Parliament, and by public opinion channeled through the electoral system as well as MPs con-
stituency representation function.  
Such a synthesis of responsibility and representation rests, however, on fragile foundations. An-
thony Lester noted how, in the British constitutional context, the absolute power expressed in the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was checked by conventions which, in turn, relied on ‘a sense 
of fair play’ shared between ministers and their civil servants.20 A more critical interpretation of the 
elite consensus  that prevailed in the Westminster-Whitehall system in London is that these rela-
tionships were constitutive of a system of 'club government’, characterised by members’ trust in all 
 
17 Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge, The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loy-
alty—and Blame, (Oxford University Press, 2006), 37–40. 
18 Georg Hegel, Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Allen Wood ed., NB Nisbet tr., Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1991), 297 
19 Ibid. 
20 Anthony Lester, ‘Fundamental Rights in the United Kingdom: the law and the British constitution’ (1976) 
125 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, December 1976 337, 339. Lester noted how this ‘sense of fair 
play’ was particularly well-suited for a homogenous Victorian elite. 
 
 
parties’ observation of the spirit of the club rules.21 Yet such a commitment to shared rules was ar-
guably essential to prevent the relationship between ministers and civil servants from becoming 
one of antagonism. Writing in the early 1940s, Donald Kingsley recognized in his Representative 
Bureaucracy, that one crucial assumption was a correspondence of views between politicians and 
civil servants. ‘The convention of impartiality’, he wrote, ‘can only be maintained when the mem-
bers of the directing grades of the Service are thoroughly committed to the larger purposes the 
State is attempting to serve; when in other words, their views are identical with those of the domi-
nant class as a whole’.22 Writing on the eve of the 1945 Labour landslide in Britain, Kingsley 
sounded a warning that unless the basis of civil service recruitment was broadened, the bureau-
cracy would resist the policies for which the future government could claim an electoral mandate.  
Ultimately, that Kingsley’s warnings proved largely unfounded in view of the post-1945 Labour pro-
gramme might point to the presence of a shared 'sense of fair play’ between politicians and civil 
servants, and thus a shared understanding as to how to mediate between responsibility and repre-
sentation. The underlying institutional configuration was similar to that of New Zealand, in which 
Leslie Lipson noted how, following the Civil Service Act 1912, conditions for a successful accommo-
dation between politicians and civil servants had emerged:  
With the political parties the modern [New Zealand] civil service has struck a mutually bene-
ficial bargain. By guaranteeing to public servants a life’s career and a pension, parties have 
foresworn the use of patronage and have guaranteed to the state’s employees their tenure 
 
21 David Marquand, The Unprincipled Society (Jonathan Cape, 1988), p. 178. See also Michael Moran, The 
British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation (Oxford University Press, 2003); David Mar-
quand, ‘Club government - the crisis of the Labour Party in the national perspective’ (1981) 16 Government & 
Opposition 19. 
22 Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British Civil Service (The Antioch 
Press, 1944), 278. 
 
 
of their jobs. In return the parties expect, and the public servants owe, equal loyalty to any 
government which the party have placed in office.23  
Such an accommodation has been essential in New Zealand, as it has in the United Kingdom, to 
resolving the tensions between responsible and representative government.24 The privileged role 
of a permanent civil service in the management of public affairs provided prudence and leadership, 
and especially consistency in an electoral system in which parties alternate in power. Serial loyalty 
to ministers, and traditional civil service anonymity underpinned doctrines of ministerial accounta-
bility, while also ensuring responsiveness to public opinion through the electoral system.  
Lipson’s ‘mutually beneficial bargain’ also accommodated a degree of representativeness, not only 
through shifting allegiance to the political programmes of popularly elected governments of differ-
ent stripes, but as a result of the self-denial by politicians of patronage powers over the establish-
ment of a professional, permanent civil service. As with subsequent analyses of ‘public service bar-
gains’,25 Lipson’s characterisation highlights the distinctly informal and often implicit nature of such 
understandings which, in contrast with the formal constitutional principles, are not amenable to 
strategies and techniques of legal transplant. ‘The peculiar and delicate conditions which… had per-
mitted the creation of that sort of depoliticised public service with which Australian and British ad-
ministrators and politicians have been familiar in their metropolitan politics', writes Schaffer, ‘were 
never present in colonial and dependent systems’.26  
 
23 Lipson (n 7), 479. It should be noted that the 1912 Act followed (criticism of) an era of extensive patronage 
in public sector appointments. 
24 We do not suggest that there have not been continued tensions over the ‘bargain’ and that this ‘accom-
modation’ has repeatedly experienced moments of potential break-down.  
25 Hood and Lodge (n 11); Bernard Schaffer, ‘Public Employment, Political Rights and Political Development’, 
in The Administrative Factor, (Frank Cass, 1973). 
26 Schaffer (n 25), 258.  
 
The immediate pre- and post-independence period in Jamaica, provides an ideal and—for scholars 
of law and public administration—thoroughly fascinating context in which to explore the role of 
informal institutions emerging in ‘peculiar and delicate conditions’. Jamaica is one of the ‘purest’ 
cases of the classic Westminster model to exist outside the UK itself.  However, the peculiar condi-
tions of the colonialism in the West Indies in general and Jamaica in particular, prevented the 
emergence of a ‘mutually beneficial bargain’ of the sort described by Lipson. Rather, what we ob-
serve might better be described as a ‘mutually suspicious bargain’.  Moreover, the post-independ-
ence political elite believed that the public service was not ‘representative’ in Kingsley’s sense of 
faithfully reflecting the new dominant interests in society, and was suspicious of administrators’ 
loyalty and competence. At the same time, bureaucrats distrusted politicians’ claims to enjoy popu-
lar support for their policies and their calls for greater representativeness in government, seeing in 
them instead challenges to settled understandings of ‘appropriate’ ways of governing and to their 
own social privilege.   
This had serious consequences for the stability of the post-independence constitutional settlement. 
As well as being not being representative, the public service was seen as lacking the necessary au-
tonomy that responsibility, in the senses noted by Birch, would seem to presuppose. As Jones and 
Subramaniam have argued,  an important aspect of the peculiar conditions that characterise socie-
ties dominated by plantation and extractive industries, was the privileged yet precarious position of 
a ‘derivative middle class’ of lawyers, teachers and clerks which mediated between the general 
public and the colonial administration. In contrast with the metropolitan middle classes, they argue, 
the middle class of colonial Jamaica was ‘lopsided because there was no corresponding economic 
 
economic middle class of distributors, retailers, service-men and rentiers to balance this profes-
sional salaried class.’27 Wholly dependent for their position on the beneficence of the colonial ad-
ministration, this derivative middle class resentful adopted an attitude that was necessarily con-
formist to the colonial regime. In other words, the institutional and social configuration which, for 
Lipson, mediated between the competing demands of responsibility and representation in New 
Zealand was prior to independence almost entirely lacking in Jamaica, as well as in the West Indian 
territories more generally. 
If there is a colonial legacy in terms of constitutionalism in Jamaica and the Commonwealth Car-
ibbean, then it therefore lies in this unresolved tension between fundamental constitutional 
principles, and the absence of supporting informal institutions to mediate between them. These 
tensions and absences led to the persistence in the post-colonial period of a ‘mutually suspi-
cious bargain’ which in turn undermined support among politicians for the broader constitu-
tional settlement of independence. To develop this argument, we next consider the ambiguity of 
constitutional principles that were inherited from the times of colonial government. 
III Crown Colony Rule and its Legacies 
Any inquiry into the nature of constitutionalism in the context of post-colonial government needs 
to start with the colonial period. This is not just because this was the period in which the independ-
ence-era constitution was written; it was also the period where the dominant informal understand-
ings about responsibility and representation were established and consequential aspects of the re-
lationship between politics and administration took shape. In the following section, we highlight 
the strong formal emphasis on responsibility that characterised the Crown colony arrangement that 
defined the government of Jamaica in colonial times. However, we also note how non-mutually 
 
27 E Jones and V Subramaniam, ‘Jamaica – Embracing Privatization and Seeking Integration’ (1993) 59 Inter-
national Review of Administrative Sciences, 651, 654. 
 
beneficial these arrangements were, creating the conditions for the unresolved nature of the ten-
sion between constitutional principles.   
The Crown colony arrangement emerged in the aftermath of the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865, 
later described by The Times as ‘one of the most acute public controversies of the nineteenth cen-
tury’.28  The constitutional significance of the Rebellion, and the bloody response of the British au-
thorities was that it led directly to the surrender by Jamaica of its seventeenth century constitution 
(known as the ‘old representative system’29), and its replacement by Crown colony administration. 
In fact, constitutional relations between the Governor and the Assembly had long been dysfunc-
tional,30 and Governor Eyre had previously, but with limited success, sought the support of the Co-
lonial Office for a new constitution. The Assembly now willingly, albeit in a moment of panic, gave 
up its existing powers.  
From a legal point of view, such as that expressed by Roberts-Wray, the expression Crown colony 
can be seen as lacking in precision. The term, he said, was ‘sometimes freely used with a degree of 
confidence which is hardly justified, for it is difficult to say precisely what it means’.31 From the in-
 
28  ‘Death of Ex-Governor Eyre’, The Times, (3 Dec. 1901), 8, quoted in Rande Kostal, A Jurisprudence of 
Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law (OUP 2008),  1. In this work, Kostal has undertaken a detailed 
legal historical analysis of the episode and its ramifications in metropolitan society—including the private 
prosecution of two officers, Nelson and Brand who had executed Gordon, as well as that of Eyre himself.  
29 We discuss the old representative system (in contrast both with French and Dutch colonial systems, as well 
as with later Crown colony rule in Lindsay Stirton and Martin Lodge, ‘Constitutionalism and Colonial Legacies 
in the Caribbean’ in Richard Albert, Derek O’Brien and Se-shauna Wheatle (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the 
Constitutions of the Caribbean (Oxford University Press, 2020), 25–46. 
30 Of particular relevance to present purposes is the disconnect in the old representative system between the 
Governor, appointed by the crown, and the locally elected representative Assembly. The latter was, as Wrong 
puts it it was to have,  ‘special powers over taxation, but it was to be kept well under control by the Governor 
and Council, and was to have no right to meddle in executive matters… [W]hatever control the Assembly se-
cured over the executive was exercised indirectly and below the surface. The power of refusing supplies was 
the one weapon which the Assembly employed against the Governor and Council’. See Hume Wrong, Gov-
ernment of the West Indies, (Clarendon Press, 1923), 41. 
31 Roberts-Wray (n 9), p. 44. 
 
 
ternal point of view of the colonial administration, the term acquired a much more detailed under-
standing. Charles Bruce quoted, in glowing terms,32 a despatch of the Duke of Buckingham, Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies between 1867–68. The Secretary of State argued that the constitu-
tions adopted in the West Indies from 1865, while differing in specifics, ‘have one feature in com-
mon—that the power of the Crown in the Legislature, if pressed to its extreme limit, would avail to 
overcome every resistance that could be made to it’.33  
This was accomplished through a set of constitutional arrangements that placed responsibility for 
all matters on the Governor. Appointed by the Sovereign on the recommendation of the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, he was, as Colonial Office Regulations put it, ‘single and supreme author-
ity, responsible to, and representative of His Majesty’. The Governor was, as Bruce puts it:  
not in the position of a constitutional sovereign; he is actual ruler. He, and he alone, is re-
sponsible for the conduct of  the local affairs of the colony. He is responsible to the Home 
Government, while his advisers are responsible to him, and not, as in a self-governing col-
ony to the local legislature.34  
Similarly, Barnett describes the role of the Governor in the following terms: 
By virtue of his control of the Legislative Council, ultimate legislative as well as executive 
power vested in him, he alone could initiate financial measures and all legislation was sub-
ject to his assent. He had the right to appoint judicial and public officers, subject to the 
 
32 ‘Seldom, if ever, has a system been more clearly explained, and in all essential principles it may be said to 
constitute the fundamental law of Crown colony government to the present day’.  Charles Bruce, The Broad 
Stone of Empire: Problems of Crown Colony Administration, With Records of Personal Experience, Volume 1 
(first published 1910, Cambridge 2010), 233. 
33 Quoted in Bruce (n 32), 235–6. 
34 Bruce (n 32), 219–20. 
 
 
overriding powers of the Secretary of State, at will. He was responsible only to the Colonial 
Office and was the sole channel of communication with the British Government.35 
Crucial to these observations are the subordinate position of advisory bodies—in formal terms, the 
Executive Council and the local legislature, the Legislative Council—as well as the Colonial bureau-
cracy headed by the Colonial Secretary. These include strong elements of representation and con-
straints on (at least, formal) local elected representation. Until 1884, there was no elective element 
to the Legislative Council. Instead, its members consisted of ex officio members (including the Co-
lonial Secretary who presented the Government’s business in the Council, as well as the main colo-
nial Heads of Department) and nominated members appointed by the Governor.36  After that year, 
an element of representation was introduced, in the form of nine elected members, increased to 
fourteen in 1895. The increase in elected members was balanced by an increase in official and 
nominated members to five and ten respectively, ensuring the government side had a bare major-
ity.37 
An executive Privy Council (more commonly, ‘Executive Council’) consisted of the Governor as Pres-
ident, the Colonial Secretary, Financial Secretary and the Attorney General, as well as two nomi-
nated officials appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Governor. It was possible for 
an unofficial (i.e. nominated or elected) member of the Legislative Council to serve on the Executive 
Council. This was, according to Hamilton, ‘a high privilege for the unofficial member, as it enabled 
him to participate in the business of policy making’.38 He further notes, however, that a frequent 
 
35 Lloyd Barnett, The Constitutional Law of Jamaica (Oxford University Press for the London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science 1977), 9. 
36 The circumstances around the introduction of elected members are discussed in Ronald Sires, ‘The Jamaica 
Constitution of 1884’ (1954) 3 Social and Economic Studies 64. 
37 A vote of any nine elected members could defeat any money bill ('the power of the nine’), while all four-
teen could defeat any bill. (“the power of the fourteen”). See Barnett (n 35), 11. 
38 B L St  John Hamilton, Problems of Administration in an Emergent Nation: The Case of Jamaica (Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1964), 35. 
 
 
criticism among members representing labour interests was that, 'the appointment of unofficial 
members to the Executive Council was limited to representatives of the employer class’.39 
As well as enabling the Governor and his administration, these constitutional arrangements also 
served—to some extent—to limit criticism and insulate the Governor from accountability. Although 
formally accountable via the Colonial Office and the Secretary of State, to the Crown, distance and 
unfamiliarity with local conditions meant that Colonial Office doctrine emphasised the discretion of 
the ‘man on the spot’; the idea that colonies were under the control of the Colonial Office was re-
garded in Downing Street as ‘the one rank heresy we all shudder at’.40 In the Legislative Council, 
the Governor not only enjoyed support of official and nominated members who were expected to 
support the Governor in their votes and their debate contributions, but by a ‘quasi-spoils system’ 
that seemed to give greater priority to the constituency needs of those elected members who 
voted with the Government.41 In the final instance, the Governor could force through any measure 
that he declared to be ‘of paramount importance to the public interest’.42  
Such insulation was never complete, however. Despite disavowals of rule from London, particular 
instances of defiance or mismanagement of governmental affairs could provoke outrage in White-
hall and Westminster, and in British society more generally, as happened following the Morant Bay 
 
39 Hamilton, (n. 38), 35. Hamilton notes the considerable difficulties of appointing members who were oppo-
nents of the Government in the legislature. Experience in Trinidad suggested that the difficulties  fell on both 
sides. Woodling points out, in the context of Trinidad and Tobago, that the Executive Council “became so as-
sociated in the public mind with supposed blind acceptance of the official Downing Street [i.e. Colonial Of-
fice] view that it became a pitfall for any member to enter in.” See H O B Woodling, ‘The Constitutional His-
tory of Trinidad and Tobago’ (1960) 6 Caribbean Quarterly 143, 154; also Craig Hewan, The Legislative Coun-
cil of Trinidad and Tobago (Faber and Faber, 1951),149. 
40 Ronald Hyam ‘Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in the Colonial Empire’ in J Brown and W M R Louis (eds.) The 
Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol IV—The Twentieth Century (OUP 1999), 257. 
41 Hamilton (n 38), 20.  
42 See Barnett (n 35), 11. 
 
 
Rebellion, noted earlier.43 This had to be balanced against criticism from local interests, who voiced 
their opposition in the local press. As Hamilton puts it,  
Invariably he needed the agility of a tight-rope walker. Any action inimical to the identifia-
ble metropolitan interests could raise a storm of protest about his head. On the other hand, 
it was equally vital that he not provoke local interests to the point where peace and tran-
quility were disturbed.44 
The selective insulation of the Governor and his administration from local interests was noted by 
the West India Royal Commission (The Moyne Commission), who described the Governor as:  
not an autocrat, inasmuch as… he and his administration are open to influence; the com-
plaint most frequently heard is, rather, that Governments are dominated by vested interests 
and that only the representatives of such interests are successful in exercising their influ-
ence.45 
Similarly, Hamilton contrasted the informality, and indeed deference, with which members of the 
bureaucracy dealt with members of their own social class with their superordinate position in rela-
tion to members of the general public who were expected to stand outside the barricades and wait 
their turn.46  
In its constitutional structure Crown colony rule seemed, in theory at least, to suggest the ultimate 
emphasis on responsible government, in the foremost sense of consistency, prudence and leader-
ship, while consciously rejecting understandings relating to accountability towards a legislative 
body or responsiveness to local public opinion. This was justified by an ideology of ‘wardship’ or 
 
43 General Picton’s defiance of anti-slavery legislation in Trinidad (1797–1802) provides another example.  
44 Hamilton (n 38), 15.  
45 West India Royal Commission Report (Cmd. 6607, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1945), Cap V, para 7, 
hereafter, ‘the Moyne Report’. 
46 Hamilton (n 38), 18  
 
‘trusteeship’ which emphasised on the one hand that the duty of the Colonial administration to 
balance the different class and ethnic interests, and on the other that this must be accompanied by 
sufficient powers to carry out that trust.  For West Indian nationalists, such as C L R James, the ide-
ology of trusteeship was a threadbare justification which barely concealed the racism underpinning 
it.47 
Even from a European and metropolitan perspective, however, the practice arguably fell far short of 
this ideal. For example, Harold Laski, writing on the eve of the 1938 disturbances, complained that 
the word ‘trusteeship’, was   
…too flattering to the results obtained. It is hardly compatible with the historic incidence of 
the facts. It is a word whose sound is too noble for the squalid results too often attained; 
for, in many cases, whether the test taken be standard of life, public health, education, or 
growth of fitness for self-government, the colonies remain, in large degree, the slums of 
empire.48 
Laski blamed this state of affairs partly on a narrow approach to recruitment, which included failing 
to develop the talents of ‘educated coloured people’49, as well as a preference for ‘sound men’ ra-
ther than ‘innovators’. Compounding this situation was the Treasury’s determination to run an em-
pire ‘on the cheap’.50 A series of official reports from the 1920s through to the 1940s shows the 
consequences of this intention, highlighting the the persistence of low salaries, poor recruitment 
 
47 ‘Men have to justify themselves, and [the colonial Englishman] falls heavily back on the “ability of the An-
glo-Saxon to govern”, “the trusteeship of the mother country until such time” (always in the distant future) 
“as these countries can stand by themselves,” etc., etc.’ See C L R James, ‘The Case for West Indian Self Gov-
ernment’ in C L R James, ‘The Life of Captain Cipriani: An Account of British Government in the West Indies’,  
(Duke University Press, 2014), 174.  
48 Harold J Laski, ‘The Colonial Civil Service’ (1938) 9 The Political Quarterly 541, p. 541. 




practices, and inadequate physical working environment for civil servants.51 Senior civil servants 
were overloaded by excessive workloads, including for some attendance in the Legislative Council 
for as many as a hundred days per year, while junior officers exhibited little initiative, passing mat-
ters for decision up to their superiors, while busying themselves with ‘administrivia’.52 The result, as 
seen locally was that ‘the bureaucracy exhibited incapacity for technical programmes as distinct 
from routine operations’.53  
The reality of responsible government was, to its critics, therefore less about consistency, prudence 
and leadership, but rather largely about maintaining law and order and ensuring economic produc-
tion. It barely included extensive understandings of development and welfare understandings only 
emerged in the 1930s and 1940s in response to trade union movements, riots and evidence of 
widespread under-development. These concerns, as well as the inability of existing constitutional 
arrangements to respond to them, were exposed by the disturbances of 1938, and laid bare in the 
Moyne Report whose findings and conclusions were largely kept from the public eye in order not 
to fuel potential opposition to colonial rule during the Second World War. 
To recap, several things are worth emphasising. First, Crown colony rule operated without the ne-
cessity of any ‘mutually beneficial’ understandings between (local) politicians and civil servants. The 
Colonial administration, in particular the expatriate officers who occupied senior positions, enjoyed 
an exalted position in related to elected members of the legislative Council. Moreover, the colonial 
system successfully monopolised local officers’ loyalties, due to the peculiar nature of the class 
structure of colonial society. In this context, demands for ‘responsibility’ were in reality demands 
 
51 These are discussed in detail in Martin Lodge, Lindsay Stirton and Kim Moloney, ‘Whitehall in the Carib-
bean? the Legacy of Colonial Administration for Post-Colonial Democratic Development’ (2015) 53 Common-
wealth & Comparative Politics 8.  
52 Edwin Jones, ‘The Executive Agency: A Manifesto Against Administrivia’ (2001) 3 Caribbean Journal of Pub-
lic Sector Management, 30.   
53 Hamilton (n 38), 31.  
 
only for responsiveness to particular colonial interests, such as local big business. Frustrated 
though they may have been, the loyalties of local administrators were completely bound up with 
the metropolitan interests and institutions. Secondly, many of the features that were later to be as-
sociated with the political sociology of post-Colonial Jamaica—including the fragility of the posi-
tion of the government, despite its apparent power, relations between the bureaucracy and sec-
tions of the public that were patron–clientelistic, the absence of technical skills to carry out pro-
grammes of social and economic reform, and the concentration of decision-making authority at 
the apex of governmental structures—were already to be found in barely concealed form in the 
unresolved tensions within Crown colony government.      
IV The Path to Independence 1944–1962 
In less than twenty years, between 1944 and 1962, Jamaica transitioned from Crown colony rule 
with a minority of elected representatives in its Legislative Council to a fully independent Common-
wealth state with a Westminster-style constitution. It is not fanciful or fallacious to see each of the 
intermediate steps as staging posts towards independence. Indeed, Colonial Office policy during 
this time embraced the doctrine of  ‘preparation’, the training of local populations ‘for the self-gov-
ernment and independence which British policy intends that they should achieve in as short a time 
as is reasonably possible’.54 Nevertheless, and in view of the various intermediate constitutional 
steps granting greater political authority, Jamaica’s path of constitutional development towards in-
dependence should not be assumed to have been planned from the outset.  
The 1938 crisis marked a sea-change in the public opinion in Jamaica—and indeed in the wider 
Caribbean. Popular unrest had long been a feature of West Indian societies, but the disturbances of 
 
54 SJ Robertson, ‘Some Problems on the Path to Self‐Government’ (1961) 39 Public Administration 313, p. 
313. 
 
1938 were, as the West India Royal Commission put it, ‘a phenomenon of a different character, rep-
resenting a mere blind protest against a worsening of conditions, but a positive demand for the 
creation of new conditions that will render possible a better and less restricted life’.55  Against this 
observation, two aspects of the Moyne Commission’s recommendations stand out.  
First, was the Report’s embrace of the need for a far-reaching programme of social welfare. This 
followed earlier acceptance by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies (Sidney Webb, Lord 
Passfield)  who noted that the poor social conditions in the colonies represented a ‘reproach to our 
colonial administration’.56 These were radical and far-reaching recommendations, notwithstanding 
their burial deep within the structure of the Moyne report,57 and despite criticism that they were 
founded on out of date assumptions about West Indian society.58 In particular, the Colonial Devel-
opment and Welfare Act 1940, passed in response to the Moyne Commission recommendations, 
accepted the principle of the UK Treasury’s responsibility for the welfare and development of its 
colonial subjects. This followed the unification of the colonial civil service in 1930 which also in-
tended to encourage the recruitment of civil servants capable of planning and development. 
A second noteworthy feature of the Moyne Report was that it placed constitutional and administra-
tive reform at the heart of its recommended response to the ‘West Indian question.’ Social regener-
ation was ‘not possible under the present form of government’. And it recognised, though it 
stopped short of endorsing, the strength of West Indian sentiment that a more expansive role for 
 
55 The Moyne Report (n 45) Cap I para. 17 (p. 8). Reporting in 1939, the Moyne Commission presented such a 
damning picture of British Colonial Rule in the West Indies that it was suppressed until 1945 for fear of the 
propaganda value to Germany of its contents. A summary of recommendations was published in 1939.  
56 Cabinet Office papers, TNA CAB21/809. 
57 As Simey puts it, proposals for welfare reform were ‘…tucked away as an appendage to an other recom-
mendation dealing with administrative machinery, and this is buried in a sub-section labelled “Other needs 
and Services”, attached in its turn as an afterthought to the section of the Recommendations dealing with 
administrative reforms in the social services’ (see T S Simey, Welfare and Planning in the West Indies, (Claren-
don, 1946), 233). It should nevertheless be noted that the Report’s executive summary that was published in 
1939 condemned ‘with a sense of shame’ the ‘situation that now exists’.  
58 Ibid.  
 
the colonial government in social and economic policy in turn meant that far from being antago-
nistic ideals, responsible government depended on a greater degree of representation than the 
mid-nineteenth conception of trusteeship allowed.   
Rightly or wrongly, a substantial body of public opinion in the West Indies is convinced that 
far-reaching measures of social reconstruction depend, both for their initiation and their ef-
fective administration, upon greater participation of the people in the business of govern-
ment.59  
The Moyne Commission, for its part, was willing to contemplate greater representation through 
variation in the composition of Legislative and Executive councils.60 However, it cautioned against 
‘any fundamental change in the parts they play in the public affairs of those colonies’, insisting in-
stead that, “The initiative in formulating policy should remain with the Governor in Executive Coun-
cil’.61 
 
Moyne’s thinking was reflected in the Jamaican Constitution of 1944.62 The precise content of the 
political rights granted under the 1944 Constitution were, as Stephens and Stephens note, the out-
come of a ‘long process of negotiation between the Colonial Office, the Elected Members Associa-
tion, and the PNP’ (the Peoples National Party).63 A reformed Legislative Council became the upper 
 
59 The Moyne Report (n 45) Cap XXII, para 2. 
60 The Moyne Report (n 45), Cap XXII, para 6 noted the importance of ‘educating unofficial in the business of 
government’, in part to address the ‘inordinate’ length of speeches in the Jamaican Legislative Council, for 
example. 
61 The Moyne Report (n 45) Cap XXII, para 4.  
62 Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1944, SI 1944/1215.  
63 Evelyn Huber Stephens and John Stephens, Democratic Socialism in Jamaica: The Political Movement and 
Social Administration in Dependent Capitalism, (Princeton University Press, 1986, 17. We were not able to in-
dependently confirm this point, but note that it is consistent with the archival record for Trinidad and To-
bago, in which the British Government undertook detailed consultation with the Peoples National Movement. 
 
 
house in a bicameral legislative structure; a newly created House of Representatives, whose mem-
bership was elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, performed the functions of a lower 
chamber. Responsibility for making policy remained with Governors in Council, chaired as before 
by the Governor. Now, however, the House of Representatives could elect five of its members to 
serve on the Executive Council.64   
 
In formal terms, the civil service remained responsible, through the Colonial Secretary and the Gov-
ernor to the Colonial Office, and ultimately the Crown. But as Byles put it, it was the voices of chairs 
of the five newly created Standing Committees of the House of Representatives, ‘which are now 
heard in the House in debates on the work of Departments—not the voices of the civil servants as 
was the case in the previous setup’.65 More generally, this period also witnessed reorganisation of 
the Colonial Service, especially in terms of advanced training opportunities.66 A new constitution in 
195367 took a step towards responsible government in the legal sense, by creating what Barnett 
called an ‘incipient cabinet system’.68 This was effected through a change in the composition of the 
Executive Council, which was now to have a eight elected members: a ‘Chief Minister’ selected by 
the Governor and approved by the House of Representatives; and seven ministers with portfolio 
responsibilities selected by the Chief Minister. Ministries were created, and took on the functions 
formerly performed by the Colonial Secretariat, but the old Executive Departments continued at 
first, leading to tensions, especially in ‘technical’ departments such as agriculture.69   
 
64 Elected members of the Executive Council were given the courtesy title of ‘Minister’, but had no portfolio 
responsibility. Sometimes they have been called ‘ministers in embryo’.  
65 G Louis Byles, ‘The Jamaican Experiment’ (1948) 56 Parliamentary Affairs 56, pp. 64–5. 
66 Colonial Office, Organisation of the Colonial Service, (1946), London, HMSO, Colonial No 197 
67 the Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1953, SI 1953/747.  
68 Barnett (n 35), 18. 
69 Hamilton (n 38), 88–9.  
 
 
From a political (but not an administrative) point of view, these anomalies were addressed by the 
1959 Constitution, which established responsible government in the legal sense.70 A Cabinet was 
established 'as the principal instrument of policy’, and its members were ‘collectively responsible' 
to the legislature.71 While from a political point of view, the 1959 Constitution seemed to establish 
internal self-government, no provision was made for a change in control of the civil service, with 
the result, as Hamilton puts it, that ‘the control of the civil service under national government re-
mained basically what it was under Crown Colony government’.72 
At the eve of independence, therefore, Jamaica had assumed the formal political institutions of re-
sponsible government. But despite the findings of the Moyne Commission that the appalling social 
and economic conditions that caused the 1938 disturbances were in part due to the ‘low standards 
of administration' practised in the colony, improvements during the post-war period were erratic, 
piecemeal and incremental.  While tensions were bound to arise in a new constitutional dispensa-
tion which civil servants for the first time expected to be responsive to the demands of politicians—
and ultimately the public—the evidence seems to suggest that relations between elected repre-
sentatives and civil servants were on the whole more cooperative than they had been before 
1944.73 There were doubtless numerous reasons for this, but among them was that the Civil Service 
had been unable to recover from the loss of prestige it suffered as a result of the 1938 disturb-
ances, and was thus reliant on the legitimacy of elected national politicians. Equally, Alexander 
Bustamante, the leader of the Jamaica Labour Party, which had won the 1944 elections, was reliant 
on support from the Departments in the face of a virile opposition.  
 
70 Jamaica (Constitution) Order 1959, SI 1959/862.  
71 Jamaica (Constitution) Order 1959 SI 1959/862, s. 47.  
72 Hamilton (n 38), 92. 
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Competence remained a challenge. Despite the acceptance by the legislature of of the Mills Report 
in 1950, the service remained rooted in routine, and was criticised for being unable to adapt to the 
expectations of Jamaicans of a service that would deliver material and social improvements in line 
with a growing economy.74 While it was a source of national pride that Jamaicans had begun to oc-
cupy senior positions, the rapid loss of expatriate officers represented a loss of expertise in a sys-
tem that had not proved effective in developing local talent..75 Pressure of work also increased, es-
pecially after the Peoples National Party took office following the 1955 elections and began to im-
plement more administratively ambitious central planning measures. Against these expectation it 
was all too easy for politicians to interpret a lack of responsiveness as `sabotage’.  
Slowly but surely, however, the old hierarchy, which placed civil servants in an elevated position vis-
à-vis elected representatives, began to invert itself. For example, in 1949 Eric Mills, the Public Ser-
vice Commissioner, observed that frankly expressing their views to politicians ‘may put at risk the 
career of any public servant’.76 With the advent of the ministerial system, argues Hamilton: 
 
74 Indeed, Colonial Development and Welfare programmes had initially been administered outside of regular 
departmental lines, under the direction of the Comptroller of Development of Welfare and Development 
working in collaboration with the Colonial Office, with the local civil service acting only in an advisory capac-
ity. 
75 A partial exception can be inferred from Gladstone Mills’ observation that with the advent Colonial Devel-
opment and Welfare funds a career the Treasury began to rival that of the Secretariat for prestige and influ-
ence. Since appointment in the Secretariat had been largely reserved to those in the top levels of colonial 
Jamaica’s ethnic-complexion hierarchy, this brought new opportunities for talented black Jamaicans to gain 
experience. He notes a number of notable individuals who served in the Treasury prior to 1944, adding that, 
‘All would rise rapidly thereafter, and especially after the introduction of the 1944 Constitution and of the 
Ministerial system in 1953’. Gladstone E Mills Grist for the Mills, Reflections on a life, (Ian Randle, 1994), 60.  
76 Eric Mills, Report of the Commission on the Public Service in Jamaica (Kingston, The Government Printer, 
1949), para. 5.7; On the Mills Report see further Lodge et al (n 51), 21–3.  
 
 
The status [civil servants] enjoyed would largely be determined by the politicians whose be-
havior would indicate to the people whether the civil service was accepted as the bureau-
cratic arm of the executive or was seen in the relationship of master and servant in  the Ja-
maican context of low status for employees.77   
This, he argues, led to a situation in which the traditional status roles, ‘were reversed so that it was 
then the civil servants who tended to become sycophants’.78 
Institutional measures were put in place to limit political control of the bureaucracy. The Public Ser-
vice Commission Law 1951 placed matters of recruitment and promotion in the hands of a statu-
tory board, the Public Service Commission. While this was intended as a measure to limit political 
patronage, the motivation may have been less about ensuring responsible government than about 
absolving the metropolitan government from complaints that it had abandoned the fate of expatri-
ate officers to the hands of local political elites.79 In other words, they were a cheap way for the 
British government to ‘shuffle out’ of its implicit commitment to colonial civil servants.  
In sum, the period of Crown colony rule had emphasised (even if it did not always live up to) a con-
cept of ‘trusteeship’ that saw local control over administration as an impediment to consistency, 
prudence and leadership. In fact, the absence of representative institutions had been irreconcilably 
associated in the public mind with serious failures of administration. Against this background, the 
post-war period, with its emphasis on ‘preparation’, was notable in terms of its attempt to reconcile 
ideals of responsibility with a greater emphasis on representation. The period is important in terms 
of the emergence of political demands for as well as institutional configurations through which 
public servants were supposed to be responsive, through the legislature, to wider movements in 
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public opinion in the territories. As seen from the Moyne report’s ambivalence on this point, this 
change of approach was not borne out of any great conviction that responsibility and representa-
tion could be reconciled given the state of political development of the West Indies, but out of a 
sense that the legitimacy of Crown colony rule had been shaken in a way that was irreversible 
within the existing constitutional framework.  
All in all, the civil service during this period was remarkable in its ability to act according to the 
ideal of neutrality, often in the face of accusations of ‘partisanship’ and ‘sabotage’. On the contrary, 
the administration often adopted an attitude of quiescence. Combined with the inability to over-
come a colonial legacy of a service more comfortable with routine than innovation, and the design 
of institutions that sought to reduce discretionary political decision-making by new political elites 
through creating new formal institutions, the picture that emerges is of a failure to design adminis-
trative institutions that could reconcile responsibility and representation. This was to prove highly 
problematic in terms of supporting the development of informal underpinnings of formal constitu-
tionalisation in the post-independence period. 
V The Post-Independence Period 
After the abortive experiment with West Indies Federation,80 which ended when in 1961 Jamaica 
voted in a referendum against participation in Federation, preparations began for the country to 
move towards independence on its own.81 Jamaica's independence constitution was framed by a 
small bipartisan committee, with little input from organised civil society or grass roots groups.82 
While there were differences within the committee, for the most part these did not extend to ques-
tioning the fundamentals of the political settlement that had been fashioned since 1944. One 
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81 Jamaica Independence Act 1962. 
82 Trevor Monroe, The Politics of Constitutional Decolonisation, Jamaica 1944–62 (Institute of Social and Eco-
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cleavage was the extent to which the new constitution fettered the post-independence leadership, 
through the entrenchment of a Bill of Rights within the Constitution, as well as the entrenchment of 
the Public Service Commissions.83  
 
Outside of the then political elites, a more radical critique was emerging. In a posthumous contri-
bution, the late Norman Girvan wrote of being part of a group of young scholars—some of whom 
would later serve as political advisers in Michael Manley’s 1972–1980 PNP government—who re-
jected the fundamentals of the Westminster model as a basis for nation-building in the Carib-
bean.84 To Girvan and other critical observers, Jamaica’s constitution of 1962 was an ‘Independence 
Pact’ the purpose of which was to preserve the status quo after the end of British rule. One focus 
for criticism was the inclusion in the Bill of Rights of the right to private property, which was argued 
to entrench patterns of foreign ownership of key areas of the Jamaican economy. In fact, the clause 
that was accepted by the committee was a compromise which allowed expropriation in the public 
interest, but required adequate compensation to be paid.85  
 
These contrasting perspectives reflect an emerging conflict between the idea that responsible gov-
ernment—particularly in its primary interpretation of consistency, prudence and leadership— de-
pended on proper limits as to the policies that could be justified by reference to the popular will, 
and those who saw such limits as placing unjustifiable limits on the path that an independent, 
democratic Jamaica could chart for itself. The latter view also included those who were sceptical 
 
83 Interestingly, some among the Jamaican political leadership fell on different sides of these issues. Edward 
Seaga for example opposed an entrenched Bill of Rights, but was in favour of clarifying the powers of the 
Service Commissions to protect public servants against some future leader who might be “willing to ransom 
an ounce of responsibility for a pound of political power.” Quoted in Patrick E Bryan, Edward Seaga and the 
Challenges of Modern Jamaica, (University of the West Indies Press, 2009), 89. 
84 Norman Girvan ‘Assessing Westminister in the Caribbean: Then and Now’ (2015) 53 Commonwealth and 
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about the practice of ‘responsible government’ in the first place and who suggested that career ad-
vancement within the civil service required responsiveness to key (big business) interests.86 In Ja-
maica, the 1960s proved a benign environment inasmuch as the policies pursued by the JLP Gov-
ernment, first under Alexander Bustamante and then (from 1967) by Hugh Shearer did not signifi-
cantly challenge the status quo. The economic policies of the 1960s continued the pattern of the 
1950s in which, according to Stephens and Stephens, ‘The state’s role was limited to providing in-
frastructure and protection and incentives to local and foreign capital, which were to be the en-
gines of economic growth’.87 These policies were heavily influenced by the scholarship of the West 
Indian economist W. Arthur Lewis, and formed the basis of a policy consensus between politicians 
and civil servants, which, as noted above, was for Kingsley were a precondition for civil service neu-
trality. Stephens and Stephens make similar claims about Jamaica’s foreign policy, which they char-
acterise as rhetorically pro-Western, was in reality isolationist, claiming that “it hardly entered the 
international arena at all.”88 Subsequent scholarship has suggested that Jamaica emerged, through 
the leadership of Prime Minister Hugh Shearer, and Ambassador to the United Nations, Egerson 
Richardson, as a major broker in international human rights diplomacy at this time.89 The broader 
point remains, however, that civil service responsiveness to the demands of political leadership re-
mained fragile, dependent on a Kingsleyan correspondence of views rather than stabilised by infor-
mal institutional commitment to a Lipsonian mutually beneficial bargain. 
 
 
86 It was this view that led Dr Eric Williams, in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, to argue that key appoint-
ments should be made by the chief minister. 
87Stephens and Stephens (n 63),  22.  
88 Stephens and Stephens (n 63) 32.  
89 Stephen L B Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Recon-
struction of Global Values (Cambridge University Press, 2016), Chapter 3.  
 
 
In fact, signs of tension already existed for those who were perceptive enough to read the signs. 
Hamilton documents the severe shortage of skilled administrative expertise facing the government 
in independence, adding that: 
Aware of the high praise showered on the Jamaica civil service in the past they fail to com-
prehend ineptitude and so politicians of both parties have at sundry times suggested delib-
erate sabotage on the part of civil service personnel.90  
For their part, civil servants were unable to respond to attempts by politicians to blame them for 
policy failures by restrictions on speaking publicly. Equally, though, Hamilton notes how civil serv-
ants, accustomed to taking direction from heads of departments, resented what they regarded as 
ministerial intrusion into their sphere of responsibility.91 
 
The perceived limitations of these features of political–administrative interactions prompted the 
government to invite the United Nations Technical Assistance Department to undertake a review of 
the Jamaica Civil Service. The review praised Jamaica’s 'strong, uncorrupt civil service' as ‘a national 
asset of incalculable and fundamental value’. Nonetheless, the resulting report warned of an exis-
tential threat to the Jamaica Civil Service if the service was unable or unwilling to be responsive to 
the demands of the elected politicians who comprised the government of the day.  
If this concept cannot be substantially realised in practice, ministers will inevitably be faced 
with the temptation to press for the appointment to positions of responsibility in the civil 
service of people who will in fact carry out their policies and plans, because of membership 
in the same political party or because they appear to the Minister to be more responsive to 
their own thinking and more active in seeing that things happen. People will be sought who 
are prepared to be wholeheartedly ‘involved’ in implementing the policy of the government 
 
90 Hamilton (n 38), 193. 
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of the day. It is the essence of democracy that the will of the people, expressed through the 
government of the day, should be carried out effectively, economically and promptly, and if 
a permanent career civil service cannot do it then other kinds of executive instruments must 
be developed.92 
These tensions emerged gradually, muted in their effects by the overall ‘consensus’ politics in Ja-
maica throughout the 1960s. Politicians, such as future prime minister Edward Seaga, experimented 
with statutory boards to overcome the perceived lack of responsiveness by the existing public ser-
vice.93 Others sought advice from particular civil servants in whom they had confidence, disregard-
ing official channels of reporting and advice. However, severe strain emerged in the 1970s when 
the demand for representative politics (and a responsive public service) took a more radical turn.  
 
VI Democratic Socialism: PNP Administration 1972–1980 
 
In Jamaica, the election victory of the PNP in 1972 marked a turn towards a more radical politics, 
which by 1974 went under the name of ‘democratic socialism’. This turn reflected, in part, also 
wider geopolitical changes, whether in terms of the turn towards more activist government in 
the early 1970s or in terms of Cold War tensions. In part, this turn was also based on particular 
Jamaican circumstances. The policy programme to which the government now committed itself 
was, in stark contrast to the earlier policies of the JLP, not only ideologically left-leaning, but ex-
tremely demanding in terms of state and bureaucratic capacity. This included at the domestic 
level nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy, a commitment to increasing 
 
92 N C Angus. W P Barrett and E Holstein E, Public Administration in Jamaica (United Nations Commissioner 
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economic self reliance including agricultural and land reform, is well as ambitious social, educa-
tional and cultural policies.94 In the field of foreign policy, Jamaica adopted an ambitious strat-
egy of third world unity, including promoting the non-aligned movement as well as continuing 
the ambitious international human rights agenda that began under the previous administra-
tion.95   
 
For then prime minister Michael Manley and the ruling PNP the civil service was perceived a 
conservative institution whose traditional emphasis on ‘neutrality’ was incompatible with their 
ambition (and what they saw as their democratic mandate) to transform society, especially in 
terms of property rights. Civil servants, it was contended, interpreted their role as ‘protector of 
the society from the whims, the fancies and the extravagancies of the politicians’.96 At the same 
time, in the face of the political ambition of expanding the state’s role in managing the econ-
omy, and the introduction of new social and cultural programmes, the civil service faced difficul-
ties in filling senior leadership positions from within its own ranks, and faced severe criticism for 
perceived poor policy performance. 
 
A number of measures were taken to overcome this perceived resistance. First, the transfor-
mation of the public service was to be achieved through the establishment of a new Ministry of 
Public Service, which would transform the civil service through the introduction of modern ad-
ministrative techniques, and to select and train personnel to higher standards of competence. 
 
94 A full inventory of the Manley administration’s principal policies and initiatives between 1972 and 1879 is 
given in Stephens and Stephens (n 63), 70-71. 
95 Ironically, given The Manley administration’s overall approach in relation to issues such as apartheid and 
third world unity, Jensen (n 89) 258–9 notes that Jamaica ‘seemed to have forgotten their own pivotal role’ in 
human rights diplomacy in the previous decade.  
96 Document submitted to the 1973 Peoples National Party Conference, ‘Jamaicanise Jamaicans’; see also Mi-
chael Manley The Politics of Change: A Jamaican Testament (Andre Deutsch, 1974), 205–6.  
 
 
There was also said to be a greater reliance on external appointments and non-Jamaican con-
sultants (see below). Members of the Public Service Commission, which had adopted a tradi-
tional approach to public sector appointments during the period between 1972 and 1976 were 
replaced, following the 1976 election,97 by individuals more sympathetic to the ‘politics of 
change’ that Manley had sought to pursue. In particular, the move was seen as an attempt to 
ensure that political commitment to fulfilment of the policies and initiatives of the administra-
tion was weighed more heavily than seniority.98 It is a sign of the administration’s commitment 
to its particular vision of personnel administration that  at this time Chairmanship of the Public 
Service Commission became a full time position. These new appointments were to establish the 
conditions for a public service that was more responsive to the needs of a developing country. 
Subsequently, one of the new members of the Commission, Edwin Jones (from the University of 
West Indies), justified the measures on a number of grounds.99 He argued that for government 
programmes reflecting ‘new development orientations’, a supposedly neutral administrative ‘ca-
dre’ was insufficient. 
 
But as well as seeking to make the civil service as it then existed more responsive, attempts were 
made, to a much greater degree than under the previous JLP government, to adopt much more 
responsive means for implementing the agendas of elected politicians. This involved successive 
government re-organisations. This involved not just the creation in 1973 of a Ministry of Public 
Service to oversee the adoption of contemporary administrative techniques; but also the Minis-
 
97 The circumstances under which the existing Public Service Commissioners were asked, and finally agreed 
to offer their resignations is described in the memoirs of then Chairman of the Public Service Commissioner 
Gladstone Mills. See G E Mills, Grist for the Mills: Reflections on a Life (Ian Randle Publishers, 136–7).  
98 Stephens and Stephens (n 63), 153. 
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try of National Mobilisation and Human Resource Development in 1977 to coordinate and mon-
itor the implementation of government policies and to act as a progress-chaser of other depart-
ments.100 In addition, the Manley government pursued a number of strategies aimed at making 
public policies more responsive to what it saw as its popular mandate. 101 
 
Second, the PNP administration sought to identify those within the public service who were pre-
pared to work with its agenda. As a 1973 party document put it, ‘[Government] must try to iden-
tify those civil servants who in spite of the screed of neutrality are nevertheless committed to 
the goals and actions of democratic socialism’. To this end, the Party created an ‘Accreditation 
Committee’ chaired by PNP Minister Robert Pickersgill. The function of the committee was to 
ensure that appointees to statutory boards and other government committees had not only the 
competence but also  the ‘commitment’ (as it was put by leading politicians at the time) to serve 
the government’s agenda. 
 
A fourth strategy was the appointment to the position of special advisors, a cadre of ideologi-
cally committed technical analysts, capable of providing an alternative to the civil service’s con-
ventional monopoly on advice to Ministers. Such special advisors should be appointed by and 
solely to the Minister; ‘These cadres should not be integrated to the regular system. They must 
work outside of it’.102 The appointment of these ‘irregulars’ (as they were known) often provoked 
the antipathy of senior civil servants, not just because of their different ideological perspec-
tives—they were radicals whereas the civil servants tended to be liberals—but also because they 
 
100 Government of Jamaica (1977) The Ministry of National Mobilisation and Human Resource Development: 
Its Nature, Structure and Functions. Ministry Paper 17 of 1977.  
101 Quoting Arnold Bertram, Patrick Bryan (n 83, 124) notes how these calls for greater responsiveness not 
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supposed benefits of greater economic nationalism in contrast to foreign ownership.  
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adopted different attitudes, mannerisms and even dress to traditional civil servants. For example, 
Stephens and Stephens quote one of the more conservative members of the then PNP Cabinet 
as describing the attitude and appearance of the West Indies economists (a group which in-
cluded Norman Girvan and George Beckford) who worked on an alternative to the IMF plan 
eventually agreed to by Manley:  
They would go up to the Bank of Jamaica wearing sandals and a tam, and demand, not 
ask, for some statistics or data and naturally people resented it. Their personal appear-
ance, all wearing tams, they were known as the ‘tam pack’.103  
Notwithstanding such culture clashes, in Stephens and Stephens estimation, when judged by 
their achievements, the ‘irregulars’ proved effectiveness in harnessing elements of the state bu-
reaucracy.104 More generally, by the mid-1970s, there was also a growing stress on the im-
portance of ‘competence’ even among these ministerial advisors.  
 
Finally, the PNP government ramped up the strategy that started with Edward Seaga as Minister 
for Development and Welfare in the 1960s of creating statutory boards as vehicles for carrying 
out public policy. Board members were not permanent appointees, but held their position for a 
fixed term. A convention developed whereby members of such boards were expected to tended 
their resignations after an election. The purpose of this convention was to further ensure re-
sponsiveness to the political goals of the administration. Again, however, by 1977, this strategy 
had been identified as problematic as these boards were diagnosed to have become unrespon-
sive to political initiatives and to have assumed the position of ‘bureaucracies in their own right’.  
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Overall, the experience of the Manley Government in the 1970s reflects the concerns initially 
flagged by the United Nations Technical Department Report of 1965. Having embarked on a set 
of programmes aimed at transforming society, the Government found the Civil Service itself to 
be one of the obstacles to achieving this goal. The criticisms of politicians of the time, however, 
went beyond familiar grumbling about civil service intransigence. Instead, the very idea of ‘neu-
trality’ was seen as incompatible with attempts at, what the PNP government called, the ‘mass 
mobilisation’ of society in pursuit of developmental goals. At the same time, it illustrated consid-
erable tensions even within that strategy: matching ‘competence’ (i.e. technical expertise to de-
liver programmes, to analyse policy options and such like) and ‘commitment’ (i.e. loyalty to-
wards a democratic socialist party seeking to challenge existing domestic and foreign policies) 
inevitably led to conflicts, concern about leaks (for example, internal documents to the opposi-
tion leader) and accusations of outright sabotage (by supporting ‘capitalist’ organisations, such 
as the daily newspaper, the Gleaner, or US interests). Compounding these administrative short-
comings was the extremely ambitious nature of the PNP’s programme throughout the period. 
As Stephens and Stephens put it, the Government during this period, ‘started too many pro-
grams, at too fast a pace, for the available state machinery to be able to handle them efficiently. 
As a result, many of these programmes were poorly implemented and constituted a greater 
drain on the government’s resources than they were supposed to do and than the government 
could afford’.105 This over-commitment could  arguably said to be compounded by a failure to 
deal effectively with patronage in public employment, despite a clear policy intention to do so.  
 
 
105 Stephens and Stephens (n 63), 312. 
 
This point represents the most extreme attempt in the post-independence period to ‘stretch’ the 
constitutional understanding towards a particular ideological version of representativeness. Sub-
sequently, as in the wider global context, the 1980s were characterised by a return towards calls 
for a more ‘responsible’ form of government and therefore also understanding of the appropri-
ate role between politics and civil service. Even though a further elaboration is outside the remit 
of this paper, subsequent waves of public service reform continued to be characterised by the 
continued presence of mutual suspicion between political and administrative elites, especially 
during times of changing government. 
 
VII Conclusions 
This paper’s central focus has been the persistence of a mutually suspicious bargain between 
political and administrative elites, reinforced by the process of decolonisation, that centred on 
the tension between constitutional doctrines of responsibility and responsiveness. The persis-
tence of this informal institution has been central to Jamaica’s constitutional development and 
represents the central British colonial legacy. The lack of agreement as to how to reconcile no-
tions of responsible and representative government, especially in relation to the relationship be-
tween political and administrative systems, has been a continual impediment to the develop-
ment of strong political institutions. 
 
This persistence of a mutually suspicious bargain can be seen in a number of ways. The continu-
ing presence of mutual suspicion had repercussions for the party political system itself. While 
the leader-centricity of the party system has been linked to initial political struggles between the 
fragmented political movement surrounding Bustamante (and the JLP) which forced the PNP to 
 
build a personality-based party (around Manley)106, the continuing centrality of the ‘leader’ can 
be interpreted as a continuing expression of a suspicion regarding the competence of the bu-
reaucracy to ‘perform’ and to do so ‘loyally’. At the same time, the continued emphasis on per-
sonal leadership and resultant patron-clientelistic relations reinforced conditions of mutual sus-
pensions, given, according to Carl Stone, the seemingly all powerful, yet uniquely vulnerable po-
sition of these leaders: 
 
The party boss or maximum leader is like a feudal monarch surrounded by a nobility who 
grow or diminish on scale of elite power depending on how he chooses to bestow fa-
vour. The maximum leader is able to keep the party together only if he constantly exerts 
personal authority over the party. The effective maximum leader can never be openly 
challenged, has the final word on most critical decisions (unless he chooses not to exer-
cise that power), and is entrusted with the maximum power to determine policy and 
overall directions of the party. Maximum leaders who show signs of indecisiveness, 
weakness and lack of control invite challenges and lose credibility because the role of 
maximum leader is defined in the political culture as demanding strength, appearances 
of personal domination, and decisiveness.107 
 
Indeed, this passage invites comparison with the position of the colonial-era Governor, who 
seemingly enjoyed a power that could avail to overcome all resistance that might be brought 
against him, yet had to maintain a fine balance between powerful opinion both locally and inter-
nationally.   
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Furthermore, the persistence of this mutually suspicious bargain is reflected in the incoming po-
litical elite that, on the one hand, inherited the ambiguous position of the governor, a suppos-
edly responsible office that nevertheless was beholden to select powerful interests. On the other 
hand, this political elite encountered an administrative elite that had not only exchanged loyalty 
towards colonial government for social status in previous times, but which was ill-equipped to 
deliver the kind of ‘representative’ programmes the new political elites, and their electoral con-
stituencies demanded of them. This, in turn, reinforced the reliance on informal and indirect 
governing networks that were classically clientistic.  
 
More generally, this paper also contributes to wider discussions regarding the impact of colonial 
legacies, and, thus, legal transplants. In contrast to those who highlight the dire consequences 
of ‘totalising institutions’ (such as a plantation economy) on subsequent political and economic 
development 108 or those that focus on formal constitutional arrangements, such as the Crown 
Colony arrangement in enabling essential administrative infrastructures109, this paper has high-
lighted the importance of distinct informal institutions, namely the role of understandings that 
support the accommodation of competing constitutional doctrines. Such informal understand-
ings or institutions are central to all forms of social life, such as contractual transactions or mar-
riage arrangements. However, as yet, these informal and usually ‘unspoken’ understandings 
have enjoyed limited attention in the context of constitutionalism or constitutional ‘transplants’ 
between metropolis and periphery. Such an emphasis raises two wider issues. One is that formal 
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constitutional systems are open to considerable degrees of change according to how constitu-
tional actors’ understandings of the ‘rules of the game’ evolve. This is particularly the case with 
respect to tensions between constitutional principles that are reflected in the formal constitu-
tion. In Jamaica, the persistence of a ‘mutually suspicious’ rather than ‘mutually beneficial’ bar-
gain fundamentally affected and reinforced these tensions and fuelled political dynamics right 
throughout the initial period of independence. More generally, such a focus also highlights how 
problematic it is to rely on simplistic understandings of colonial governance that supposedly es-
tablished the basis for subsequent infrastructures of administrative power. Instead, the legacy of 
(Crown colony) colonial government was an unresolved ambiguity about how to govern, and 
the lack of ‘mutually beneficial understandings’ shared among actors in the political system. The 
result was a persistent, ongoing antagonism which frustrated political, economic and social de-
velopment.  
